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Abstract: In this paper, we provide a definition of mobile payments and we analyze the 
markets that could be targeted by mobile payment service providers, both in developed 
and in developing countries. Focusing on the case of developed countries, we introduce 
five cooperation models that have emerged or could emerge between banks, mobile 
network operators, and payment systems, for the development of this payment method. 
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ince its introduction in the 1980s, mobile telephony has developed 
rapidly. In 2009, worldwide, about two thirds of the population had 
access to a mobile phone.1 In contrast with other technologies, the 
developing world is catching up fast; for instance, according to the 
International Telecommunications Union, in 2008, the penetration of mobile 
services in developing countries was at the same level as in Sweden just 10 
years earlier.2 
Today, due to their widespread adoption, a mobile phone is viewed not 
only as a communication device, but also as a potential payment device. For 
instance, a study from Arthur D. Little states that so-called "mobile 
payments" will represent a total transaction volume of $250 billion by 2012.3 
Usual arguments in favor of mobile payments are that in developed 
countries, mobile users are accustomed to making micro payments with their 
                       
1 In 2009, worldwide, there were 67 mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. See: "The World 
in 2009: ICT Facts and Figures," ITU, 2009. 
2 See: "The World in 2009: ICT Facts and Figures," ITU, 2009. 
3 See: "Global M-Payment Report Update – 2009," Arthur D. Little. 
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mobile phones to purchase digital content (e.g., ringtones or games4) or 
applications (e.g., for iPhones or Android mobile phones) and that in 
developing countries, the very poor quality of existing payment solutions 
creates room for mobile payment solutions.  
The objective of this paper is to study the prospects of mobile payments 
in developed countries, and to analyze the potential business models that 
could result from the cooperation of banks and mobile network operators. 
Table 1 - Possession of mobile phones and payment cards  
in some developed and developing countries. 








United States  0.9  3.8  Taiwan  1.1  1.9 
Canada 0.7  3.4  Russia  1.4  0.9 
United Kingdom  1.3  2.4  China  0.5  1.3 
France 0.9  2.3  India  0.3  0.1 
Australia 1.1  2.5  Thailand  0.9  0.6 
Sweden 1.2  0.8  Poland  1.2  0.8 
Japan 0.9  6.0  Colombia  0.9  0.5 
South Korea  0.9  3.4  Morocco  0.7  0.1 (est.) 
Brazil 0.8  2.2  Nigeria  0.4  0.0  (*) 
(*) Payment cards are however developed to some extent in Nigeria. At the end of 2007, there 
were 512,000 debit cards and 95,000 credit cards. Source: "Credit cards around the world : 
Nigeria," available at http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-cards-around-the-
world-nigeria-1276.php 
Sources: for the number of mobile phones per capita: ITU, 2008; for the number of cards: 
Euromonitor International, 2009. "Payment cards" include: credit cards, debit cards, and charge 
cards (ATM cards and retailer private cards are excluded); for the population: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators Database, 2009. 
The economic impact of mobile payments will, indeed, probably strongly 
differ in developed and developing countries. Table 1 below compares the 
number of mobile phones per capita to the number of payment cards per 
capita, in some developed and developing countries. The table shows that in 
developed countries, there are generally more payment cards than mobiles 
phones. This suggests that mobile payment solutions would have to 
compete with debit and credit cards and other existing means of payment. 
However, in developing countries, the situation is quite different, as there are 
                       
4 For instance, in 2007, the sales of ringtones in Europe were of about $1.1 billion (see: 
"Ringtone market comes to the end of its crescendo," The New York Times, 16 December 
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often more mobile phones than payment cards.5 In these countries, where a 
large proportion of the population is unbanked, mobile payments could 
represent an electronic payment solution and would not face the same 
degree of competition with existing payment instruments. 
Though mobile payment solutions have attracted a lot of attention, they 
have so far developed slowly, except in a few countries. Two notable 
success stories are the development of contactless mobile payments in 
Japan by the incumbent mobile network operator NTT DoCoMo, and the 
development of the M-Pesa mobile payment solution in Kenya.  
Different issues and problems are often cited to explain the slow 
development of mobile payments: low willingness to pay,6 technical and 
standardization hurdles, lack of incentives from mobile operators or banks, 
problems of coordination, security and privacy issues,7 etc. In this paper, we 
propose to study the incentives of banks and mobile operators to invest in 
mobile payments, and the incentives of consumers and merchants to adopt 
this technology. 
We define five business models of cooperation between banks, MNOs, 
and payment systems: the light model, the mobile-centric model, the bank-
centric model, the partial-integration model, and the full-integration model. 
Each business model is characterized by the degree of dependency or 
cooperation between these three key players. We argue that the partial-
integration and the full-integration models are the most costly to develop, but 
the more efficient to target the mass market. On the other hand, the light 
model is the most favorable to introduce innovative payment services, but 
restricts firms to target niche markets. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the 2
nd Section, we start 
by defining mobile payments and by analyzing which markets could be 
targeted by mobile payments service providers. In the 3
rd one, we argue that 
mobile payments should be viewed as an innovation in payment systems, 
and we study the suppliers' incentives to develop this innovation, and the 
                       
5 See for instance the figures about India, Colombia, Morocco and Nigeria. Note that our figures 
also show that in some developing countries (e.g. China, Brazil, and Taiwan) the possession of 
payment cards is quite common. 
6 According to KPMG's third annual Global Consumers and Convergence survey (2009), 85 
percent of the US respondents believe mobile banking is important, but they do not want to pay 
for it. 
7 According to KPMG's survey (2009), 48 percent of the US respondents who had never tried 
banking through a mobile device cited privacy and security issues as the main reasons. 98     No. 79, 3
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consumers' incentives to adopt it. In the 4
th Section, we introduce our five 
models of cooperation between banks, mobile network operators, and 
payment systems. Finally, we conclude by summarizing our main findings.  
   Mobile payments and potential markets 
A definition of mobile payments 
Mobile payments are generally defined as the process of the exchange of 
money for goods and services between two parties using a mobile device, 
such as mobile phones, wireless devices, computers or PDAs, in return for 
goods and services.8 For instance, consumers could use their mobile 
phones to pay at the Point of Sales or to purchase goods from cyber 
merchants. However, this definition excludes mobile money transfers which 
occur without any exchange of goods or services, such as Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) money transfers. As P2P money transfers seem to have caused an 
increase in the use of mobile phones for exchanging money, in particular for 
remittances, we focus in this paper on "mobile money transfers," which we 
define as transfers of money between two parties involving a mobile device, 
be they Business-to-Business (B2B), Business-to-Consumer (B2C), 
Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C), or Consumer-to-Business (C2B). This 
definition includes remittances and P2P money transfers, but excludes all 
the banking services that can be provided through mobile devices, and that 
do not involve money transfers, such as account information or portfolio 
management services. Also, this definition does not restrict the scope of our 
study to the case in which mobile devices are used as a means of payment, 
which up to today, as we will argue later in this paper, is not necessarily the 
most common situation. 
Mobile money transfers rely on different types of technological solutions, 
which differ for remote money transfers and proximity payments. In the 
following table, we provide some examples of the types of transfers that can 
be made using a mobile device. 
                       
8 See for instance the definition of the Mobile Payment Forum (2002) cited in WARIS et al. 
(2006). M. BOURREAU & M. VERDIER  99 
Table 2 - Examples of money transfers with a mobile device 
  Remote payments  Proximity payments 
Low value 
payments 
Ringtones, games, low-value 
P2P payments. 
Vending machines, parking, transit, fast 
food restaurants, gasoline purchases (C2B). 
Medium and high 
value payments 
Remittances (P2P). Bill 
payments (C2B and B2B). 
Cyber merchants (C2B). 
Retail outlets (C2B). 
Remote money transfers refer to the transactions that can be conducted 
independent of the user's location, and that do not require a Point of Sales 
terminal. Examples include remittances and P2P payments, delivery of 
digital services, and prepaid Top-Up services. For these types of money 
transfers, the first solution is to use the mobile device as an access channel 
to other traditional payment instruments, such as payment cards, checks or 
credit transfers. In this case, the payment is initiated through the mobile 
device, using a short message service (SMS) or the wireless application 
protocol technology (WAP). Sometimes, the mobile phone can be also used 
to authenticate transactions from payment cards (e.g. Vodafone m-pay card 
system in the UK enables users to charge purchases directly to payment 
cards they have pre-registered with the service). However, other traditional 
payment instruments remain needed to settle the transaction, and the mobile 
device cannot be defined as a means of payment. The payments initiated by 
the mobile device have to be "post-paid" by the consumers. To that end, 
Mobile Network Operators often use "reverse billing," which consists in 
placing payments as additional items on the customers' post-paid phone bill.  
For remote money transfers, another solution is to use the mobile device as 
an e-wallet, which operates the same way as prepaid cards. In this case, 
consumers store units of electronic money either in the SIM card of their 
mobile phones, or on the hard disk of their computers, and must reload 
regularly their e-wallets by other means of payment.9 One could also 
imagine other remote payment solutions, in which the mobile device would 
become a payment instrument, enabling the consumer to transfer money 
from his bank account without the need of an existing payment solution. 
Proximity money transfers refer to the situation in which the mobile 
device locally communicates with a Point of Sales (POS) or an Automatic 
                       
9 In Europe, e-money is defined as "monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer 
which is: i) stored on an electronic device, such as a chip card or computer memory; ii) issued 
on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value issued; iii) accepted 
as a means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer" (Directive 2000/46/EC). Strictly 
speaking, e-money is not a payment instrument, but a means of payment that can be 
substituted for cash and deposits. 100     No. 79, 3
rd Q. 2010 
Teller Machine (ATM) via contactless technologies (e.g., Bluetooth, IrDA, 
RFID, Near Field Communication).10 For this purpose, the mobile device has 
to be equipped with a chip that stores the users' account information, while 
merchants require special POS readers. The chip is either separated from 
the SIM card of the mobile network operator or embedded in it. The payment 
can then be made by tapping or waving the mobile device with an embedded 
chip at the contactless POS reader. Notice that, with this definition, any 
object that is carried by the consumer, and that is equipped with the relevant 
technology to transfer money is a mobile device. The mobile device can be 
viewed as a "carrier" rather than as an independent payment instrument. 
The mobile phone handset may have a competitive edge over contactless 
cards or other potential carriers for the provision of money transfer services, 
as it is equipped with a small-scale screen that enables the consumers to 
have access to customized payment applications. 
Potential markets 
Which markets could be targeted by mobile payment service providers? 
Mobile payment service providers could offer services to consumers without 
payment instruments. For instance, there might be a potential for mobile 
payments for young people with prepaid solutions, or unbanked people, both 
in developed and developing countries. As shown in the table below, the 
market of unbanked customers is a niche in developed countries, while it is a 
mass market in developing countries. 
To understand if mobile payment service providers are able to target the 
market for unbanked, we have to examine why these people do not have a 
bank account. There are two ways of accounting for the number of 
unbanked. A first explanation is related to the supply-side: banks may decide 
not to serve all consumers, either because of information asymmetries, such 
as the lack of a credit history, or because they estimate that some 
consumers are too risky. In this case, prepaid payment instruments can be 
                       
10 "Bluetooth wireless technology is a short-range communications system intended to replace 
the cables connecting portable and/or fixed electronic device." (Source: Bluetooth.com). IrDA 
refers to the Infrared Data Association, which set up a standard for communication between 
devices over short distance using infrared signals. The Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is 
a technology used for automatically identifying a package or an item. It is a replacement for the 
barcode. The Near Field Communication (NFC) is a new, short-range wireless connectivity 
technology that evolved from a combination of existing contactless and interconnection 
technologies. M. BOURREAU & M. VERDIER  101 
used by banks or other payment service providers to serve the unbanked or 
the underbanked. By requiring consumers to pay early for future purchases 
or services, the prepaid model eliminates payment risk for the issuer of the 
prepaid payment instrument.11 The total value of transactions made with 
prepaid devices is bound to remain limited, as consumers must reload their 
prepaid instrument regularly which is inconvenient for transactions of larger 
amounts. Also, regulators often decide to impose a limit on the maximum 
amount that can be prepaid.  
Table 3 - Some figures about the unbanked in developed and developing countries (*) 
  Proportion of unbanked  Source 
United-States  7.7% of households have no bank 
account. 17.9% are underbanked.
FDIC "National Survey of unbanked and 
underbanked households" (2009). 
France  1.6% of households have no bank 
account. 
IFOP (2007) and Fédération Bancaire 
Française.  
United-Kingdom  8% of households.  "Banking the unbanked," House of 
Commons Treasury Committee, Thirteenth 
Report session 2005-2006. 
Western Europe  <20% of the population.  "Finance for all?" A World Bank Research 
Report (2008). 
India  41% of the population.  Reserve Bank of India 
Sub Saharan 
Africa  
>80% of the population.  "Finance for all?" A World Bank Research 
Report (2008). 
Latin America  High variation from 40% in Chile 
to 80% in Nicaragua 
"Finance for all?" A World Bank Research 
Report (2008). 
(*) For less recent but more comprehensive data about access to financial services, see Beck et 
al. (2007). 
Another explanation of the number of unbanked is related to the demand 
characteristics. As shown in table 4, the consumers give various reasons for 
not holding a bank account, which differ in developed and developing 
countries. Some of the reasons given (such as costs or privacy) could also 
apply for the adoption of mobile payment solutions. Hence, it would be 
erroneous to equate the potential market for mobile payments to the number 
of unbanked, especially in developed countries. In developing countries, the 
comparison of the launch of the M-Pesa service in Kenya and in Tanzania 
reveals that financial literacy plays a role in the adoption of mobile payment 
services.12  
                       
11 In developed countries, mobile prepaid services would have to compete with prepaid cards. 
12 See: "What makes a successful mobile money implementation? M-Pesa in Kenya and 
Tanzania," FSD Kenya report (2009). 102     No. 79, 3
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Table 4 - Main reasons given for not having a bank account 
Main reason  United-States (%) Mexico (%) 
Do not need account/no savings  53  7 
Not comfortable with banks/don't trust banks  18  16 
Want to keep records private  22  2 
Fees and minimum balance too high  45  70 
Inconvenience-location and hours  10  2 
Lack of documentation  10  3 
Source: World Bank Research Report "Finance for All?" (2008) 
Another interesting aspect of the studies about the unbanked in 
developed countries reveals that a large proportion of this population are 
migrants or ethnic minorities, who resort to remittances to send their money 
to their country of origin. For instance, the FDIC report (2009) on the 
unbanked in the United-States shows that some minorities are more likely to 
be unbanked, such as black households (21.7% are unbanked), Hispanics 
(19.3%), and American Indians (15.6%). These figures suggest that the 
unbanked populations in developed and developing countries may be 
potentially interconnected, and that mobile payment service providers could 
seek to exploit this market opportunity.  The success of the start-up Obopay 
in the United-States supports the view that the niche markets in developed 
countries and the mass markets in developing countries may be 
complementary.13  
If mobile payments services are not only designed for the unbanked, they 
could also become a substitute for the existing electronic payment 
instruments, such as bank cards. So far, in most European countries, banks 
have provided payment instruments as a package with a bank account. 
Hence, the provision of mobile payment solutions by nonbanks such as 
mobile operators will require cooperating with banks to link the payment 
instrument to the banking account. As we will see later in the paper, banks' 
incentives to cooperate with nonbanks seem to be low.  
To conclude, mobile payments will have to provide sufficient value 
improvement to consumers or merchants to develop in mature payment 
markets. This raises more generally the question of the digitization of 
                       
13 Obopay is a payment application that enables consumers to purchase, pay and transfer 
money using their mobile devices. Obopay created a subsidiary in India in March 2008 for 
payments and cross-border remittances. M. BOURREAU & M. VERDIER  103 
payment instruments. It is for instance interesting to note that electronic 
wallets have not been much of a success in many countries.14 In the next 
section we will analyze how the adoption of payment innovations in 
developed countries depends on a complex set of interacting variables. 
   Mobile payment devices as an innovation  
in developed countries 
Mobile payments can be viewed as an innovation in the retail payments 
market. In this section, we study the players' incentives to innovate and 
deploy mobile payment solutions, and the incentives of consumers and 
merchants to adopt mobile payment methods. We now restrict our analysis 
to the case of developed countries as the business case for mobile 
payments in emerging countries is very different.15 
The retail payments market exhibits certain characteristics that must be 
taken into account in our analysis of players' incentives to innovate. The 
economic literature stresses the two-sided nature of retail payment systems. 
Retail payment systems are characterized by membership and usage 
externalities between two distinct groups of users, the consumers and the 
merchants.16 The more consumers adopt mobile payments, the more 
merchants will be willing to upgrade their terminals, and vice versa. Hence, 
mobile payment service providers must find the appropriate price structure to 
bring both sides of the market on board, and solve the "chicken and egg" 
issue that arises when neither consumers nor merchants are equipped with 
the same payment solution.17 Due to the presence of economies of scale 
and network effects, competing players in payment systems have strong 
incentives for standardization and cooperation. The example of payment 
                       
14 Several schemes, such as Multibanco in Portugal, Danmønt in Denmark, and Avant in 
Finland, were closed down. Notable exceptions are Proton in Belgium or the Octopus card in 
Hong-Kong. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the factors of success of e-purses. 
See VAN HOVE (2004) for an assessment of the success of e-purses in Europe. 
15 As explained in the previous section, this is in particular due to the fact that a significantly 
larger share of the population is unbanked in developing countries. 
16 See VERDIER (2006) for a review of the literature on two-sided markets applied to payment 
systems, and BEDRE-DEFOLIE & CALVANO (2010) for a recent contribution which takes into 
account membership and usage fees in payment systems. For a more general analysis of two-
sided markets, see ROCHET & TIROLE (2006) and WEYL (2010). 
17 The choice of the price structure must take into account the expectations of merchants and 
consumers about the adoption of the new payment system. 104     No. 79, 3
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cards shows that the building of a joint-venture can considerably reduce the 
costs of incompatibility between different standards.  
Another striking feature of the payments industry is that it has been 
dominated by banks, which compete in the market for deposits. Nonbanks, 
such as PayPal, have been able to enter the virtual goods market, in which 
banks were traditionally slower to innovate, and less ready to cater to the 
needs of the consumers. If mobile payments were to become a widely-used 
solution at the POS, it remains to analyze if new payment systems could be 
provided by nonbanks that are neither experienced with managing deposits, 
nor equipped with an ATM network. As we will explain later in this paper, the 
mobile payment service provider would have to choose between catching-up 
with banks by investing in payment and withdrawal infrastructure, bear the 
costs of accessing the existing infrastructure, or adopt a "light model" without 
a large acceptance network. 
As mentioned earlier, mobile payments constitute an innovation from the 
point of view of banks and mobile network operators. Chakravorti and Kobor 
(2005) identify four generic incentives to invest or innovate in payment 
systems: (i) cost reduction; (ii) increasing revenues by the introduction of 
new products or services or by differentiating customers; (iii) customer 
acquisition; (iv) customer retention. We apply this typology to analyze the 
banks' and the MNOs' incentives to develop mobile payment solutions. Our 
analysis is summarized in table 5 below.18  
Table 5 - Incentives to adopt mobile payments for banks and MNOs 
  Banks Mobile  Network  Operators 
Consumer retention  Mobile payments as a way to defend 
market  shares 
Important: high churn rate in 
mobile 
Consumer acquisition  Important if unbanked market is 
large and unbanked consumers have 
sufficiently high willingness to pay 
Not important: mobile markets 
are mature (see table 1) 
Generate new 
revenues 
If additional value of mobile 
payments relative to existing 
payment instruments 
Important: MNOs are looking for 
new revenue streams 
Reduce costs  Important if substitution with cash or 
checks: costs of cash and checks 
Not applicable (MNOs are new 
entrants) 
Other motivations  Developing mobile payments to 
deter MNOs and nonbanks from 
entering the payment market 
- 
                       
18 For a detailed analysis of each motive, see BOURREAU & VERDIER (2010). M. BOURREAU & M. VERDIER  105 
There are, however, many obstacles to investment, for both banks and 
MNOs. First, the costs of deploying a mobile payment solution would be 
probably high. In particular, terminals at the point of sale would have to be 
upgraded or replaced. One solution would be to develop gradually merchant 
acceptance, for instance, by installing mobile payment systems in vending 
machines, or by signing agreements with large retailers, such as transport 
service providers (cf. Mobilkom in Austria). Second, if the development of 
mobile payment solutions involves coordination between banks, mobile 
network operators and nonbanks, there could be coordination costs. Third, 
there is still some regulatory uncertainty about mobile payments, which may 
lead players to wait.19 
If banks and MNOs do not cooperate in the development of mobile 
payment solutions,20 there is also a cost to each player of entering the other 
player's market. MNOs operate networks with large coverage and have 
billing relationships with their clients, however, the traditional banking 
functions (cash management, risk control, short term loans) are not part of 
their core business. The cost of setting up and servicing deposit accounts 
would be probably prohibitive, and therefore prepaid solutions look to be the 
most viable way of providing liquidity in a "bank-less" system. However, the 
question remains whether consumers would see enough value in such 
prepaid offers. As for banks, developing mobile payments without the 
cooperation of MNOs will require them to cooperate with mobile handset 
manufacturers. 
The success of mobile money transfers depends on the users' incentives 
to adopt the new technologies. On the consumer side, the incentives to 
adopt contactless payments depend on the price of the service, on the 
security offered by the service provider, and on the convenience of the 
payment method. A survey conducted by the De Nederlandsche Bank on 
consumer criteria for selecting M-payments shows that 65.8% of the 
consumers expect the service to be user-friendly, while 52.2% of the 
consumers expect it to be widely available.21 If the mobile payment solution 
does not provide any value to the existing payment solution for consumers, 
                       
19 See Section 5 of BOURREAU & VERDIER (2010) for a more detailed discussion of 
regulatory uncertainty, antitrust law and consumer protection issues. 
20 See the next section for a discussion of the different cooperation scenarios. 
21 The survey was based on a total of 10,604 replies, and it was only addressed to experienced 
online shoppers, which explains probably the fact that the costs were the fourth most important 
criterion according to this survey (27% of the consumers selected "low cost" as a criterion for 
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its deployment is likely to fail, as it proves difficult to convince the users to 
change their habits. For instance, ONDRUS et al. (2009) explain the failure 
of the mobile payment solution developed by PostFinance in Switzerland by 
the lack of value added to the existing payment card solution, and the 
difficulties to change consumer behavior.22 On the merchant side, the 
incentives to adopt contactless payments depend on the costs of upgrading 
the existing payment terminals, on the security of contactless transactions 
and on the additional benefits that can be provided by the services, such as 
consumer information, mobile couponing or customer acquisition/retention. 
The incentives to adopt mobile payments may not be the same for online 
merchants, large retailers or small retailers. For online merchants, the 
capacity to offer various payment instruments to match consumers' demand 
can be viewed as quality differentiation. For proximity payments, the 
merchants have to be convinced that they can earn a positive return on 
investment in upgrading POS, or enhancing their electronic payment 
solutions.23 The lack of agreement over common standards may slow down 
the investment process as the merchants may decide not to run the risk of 
adopting a technology that may need to be replaced rapidly. However, once 
a critical mass is reached, small retailers may wish to adopt the innovation to 
avoid losing market share. The economic theory (See ROCHET & TIROLE, 
2002) predicts indeed that the merchants may be ready to pay a higher fee 
than the benefit they obtain from accepting a payment instrument because of 
the strategic interactions between merchants on the retail markets.  
   Cooperation models for the development  
of mobile payment solutions 
In this section, we study five cooperation models between the key players 
that could be involved in a mobile payment solution, and we discuss the 
strategic interactions within each model.24 
                       
22 PostFinance was in an ideal position to implement a mobile payment solution in 2005 as it 
was a dominant player (60% of the daily transactions). However, according to ONDRUS et al. 
(2009), "the payment process was not simpler and faster than the use of the traditional 
PostCard." 
23 According to ARANGO & TAYLOR (2008), the costs for merchants of accepting payment 
instruments for a $36.5 transaction are $0.25 for cash, $0.19 for a debit card and $0.82 for a 
credit card. 
24 We choose to organize our description of the business models according to the forms of 
cooperation that can emerge between MNOs and banks, instead of analyzing mobile payments M. BOURREAU & M. VERDIER  107 
Before describing the different cooperation models, we start by 
discussing how a mobile payment solution can be organized. A mobile 
payment solution may involve three different inputs: i) a mobile phone, ii) a 
bank account, and iii) a payment platform. As we consider mobile payment 
solutions based on mobile phones, the mobile phone is an essential input. 
However, the bank account and the payment platform are not essential 
inputs, since mobile payment solutions can be prepaid and target niche 
markets with few affiliated merchants. Up to now, each of these inputs has 
been controlled by a key player. Mobile network operators (MNOs) and 
mobile handset manufacturers have control over the design and distribution 
of mobile phones, as the former commercialize the phones at subsidized 
prices in their commercial agencies and own the SIM card, while the latter 
produce the phones. Banks have control over their consumers' accounts. 
And, finally, payment platforms like Visa or Mastercard have control over 
large acceptance networks. 
The adoption of a business model for a mobile payment solution involves 
the choice of how much to depend on these three key players. First, a 
solution can be developed without the cooperation of MNOs and mobile 
phone manufacturers. For instance, the payment application can be resident 
on a separate memory card.  Second, the mobile payment solution could be 
based on the payment card of the consumers, in which case the provider 
does not need a direct and strong cooperation with the banks in order to 
have access to the consumers' bank accounts. For instance, Obopay allows 
consumers to add money to their Obopay account with their debit or credit 
cards, and then send money to relatives or merchants with their mobile. 
Though Obopay proposes its service to banks, it has been developed 
without their direct cooperation. However, Obopay has decided to cooperate 
with a large acceptance network (MasterCard).25 Third, a mobile payment 
service provider could develop a solution without the cooperation of existing 
payment platforms (like Visa or Mastercard) if it decides to target a niche 
market. For instance, the provider could limit the acceptation of its payment 
solution to vending machines (like Mobilkom A1 in Austria) or to a few 
                       
as a strategic substitute to the existing payment instruments (cash, check, debit or credit card, 
etc.). Whatever the form of cooperation, mobile payments can substitute with any existing 
payment method. 
25 Obopay does not only provide mobile phone payment services, but also card payment 
services, thanks to its partnership with MasterCard. As a result, the consumers can use their 
Obopay card to have access to the existing ATM networks in which MasterCard cards are 
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affiliated merchants (like Obopay, which targets mainly P2P transfers but 
proposes merchants to affiliate to the system at no fee). 
The following figure represents the economic relationships between the 
different players which might be involved in a mobile payment solution. The 
solid lines represent the existing economic relationships, whereas the 
dashed lines represent economic relationships that might either exist or not. 
For instance, as we explained above, a mobile payment solution might be 
developed without the cooperation of MNOs or handset manufacturers if it is 
an application that is installed by the consumers on their mobile phones. 
Similarly, the mobile payment service provider can bypass issuing banks 
and the payment platform if it tries to affiliate directly consumers and 
merchants. 
Figure 1 - Economic relationships between the players involved  












Since each of the three key players (banks; mobile network operators or 
mobile phone manufacturers; payment platforms) can be bypassed or not by 
the mobile payment service provider, we have a priori six different possible 
business models. We consider that there are different degrees of 
dependency or cooperation between the mobile payment service provider 
and the key players. Full dependency takes place when they either form a 
joint venture or integrate vertically, or when one of the key players is the 
initiator of the service. The table below gives five possible business models 
and provides some examples for each model.  M. BOURREAU & M. VERDIER  109 
Table 6 - Five business models for mobile payment services 
Degree of dependency or cooperation with a…   
Bank 
Mobile network operator 
or mobile phone 
manufacturer 
Payment platform 
Light model  Weak  Weak  Weak 
Examples  - Obopay (*) in the US: consumers use their payment cards to add money on their 
Obopay account, and can use any mobile phone. Obopay targets the niche market 
of P2P payments.  
- Amazon Mobile Payments Service (MPS): consumers make a purchase on an 
affiliated merchant's website with their mobile phone using the Amazon MPS and a 
pre-registered debit or credit card. Amazon MPS targets the market of Internet 
payments. 
- Other examples include mpayy in the US or PayPal Mobile Payments. 
Mobile-centric model  Weak  Strong  Weak 
Examples  - The initial mobile prepaid solution proposed by NTT DoCoMo in Japan 
corresponds to the mobile-centric model. 
- In the mobile-centric model, we also find the bill-to-carrier model, where service 
providers charge consumers on their mobile bill. For instance, Zong and Boku sell 
digital content and virtual goods in online games and charge on the mobile bill (**) 
- The Vodafone/O2 payment service in Germany (***)("mpass") is a combination of 
the established direct debit system and of a text message confirmation system, 
which targets online payments. 
Bank-centric model  Strong  Weak  Strong 
Examples  - In the bank-centric model, banks develop a mass market mobile payment solution 
without the cooperation of MNOs and mobile phone manufacturers. 
- An example is the MOVO service of Caisse d'Epargne in France, a payment 
service by SMS which has been available between 2006 and 2009. 
Partial integration model  Strong  Strong  Weak 
Examples  - The partial integration model takes place when there is a strong link between a 
bank and an MNO. 
- For example, an MNO can create or integrate with a bank. This corresponds to the 
payment solution developed by Mobilkom in Austria. The incumbent mobile 
operator, Mobilkom, created a bank subsidiary (A1) and restricted its mobile 
payment solutions to vending machines. 
- On the other side of the coin, a bank can create an MNO. For instance, Rabo 
Mobile is a service provided by a Dutch bank, Rabobank, which combines a mobile 
communication service and a mobile payment solution. 
Full integration model  Strong  Strong  Strong 
Examples  - For instance, the full integration model corresponds to a situation of vertical 
integration over the value chain, where a single company provides mobile services, 
payment services, and has access to a large acceptance network. One example is 
the mobile operator NTT DoCoMo in Japan, which acquired a bank and a large 
retailer. 
- Another potential example of the full integration model is the setting up of a joint 
venture between banks, MNOs, and a payment system. 
(*) See footnote 13 for a presentation of Obopay. 
(**) The mobile operator takes a relatively large share of the transaction, which shows that the 
service provider is strongly dependent of the mobile operator. For instance, in the US, carriers 
are said to take 50% or more of the transaction, whereas in Europe, they take around 25% (see: 
"A Bad Connection for Mobile Payments", http://www.mpayy.com/news/2009/12/02/a-bad-
connection-for-mobile-payments/). 
(***) See: http://www.vodafone.com/start/media_relations/news/local_press_releases/germany/ 
germany_press_release/o2_and_vodafone_launch.html 110     No. 79, 3
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The last possible business model corresponds to a situation where the 
mobile payment service provider owns a bank or is a bank, but bypasses the 
MNOs and the payment platform. We consider that this model is not 
relevant, as banks have strong incentives to develop a mass market 
solution, which would require cooperating with a payment platform, or 
developing one. 
These different models involve different degrees and forms of 
cooperation. The "light model" involves the lowest degree of cooperation 
with other players. However, it is easier to implement as the barriers to entry 
are lower, and it seems the most common. The strategy adopted by mobile 
service providers in this model consists mainly in targeting niche markets 
and builds on the existing infrastructure for the payment process. This model 
is consistent with the literature on payment systems: as noted by 
CHAKRAVORTI & LUBASI (2006), "payment innovations are generally more 
successful when they utilize existing infrastructure and initially target 
profitable niche markets." However, one of the problems faced by the 
service providers is the affiliation of consumers and merchants. This may 
explain why this business model is often adopted by cyber merchants like 
Amazon.com or online payment services with wide coverage like PayPal. 
These players have indeed already access to a large acceptance network 
because of the scale of their activities. The "bank-centric" and "mobile-
centric" models involve a strong partnership with either a bank or a mobile 
operator (or a handset manufacturer). For instance, some banks have tried 
to launch mobile payment services on their own, such as Caisse d'Epargne 
in France between 2006 and 2009. Also, the mobile-centric model includes 
the payment applications that are developed by start-ups to purchase digital 
content, such as Zong and Boku. However, these companies depend on a 
strong partnership with the MNOs as the content is charged to the consumer 
through reverse-billing. 
Finally, the "partial-integration" and "full-integration" models involve 
strong relationships between different players. These relationships are costly 
to establish, but may generate substantial benefits for the participants, in 
terms of cost-sharing or synergies. The low number of strong partnerships 
between banks and MNOs can be explained by the cost of coordination 
between players which have different objectives26 and incentives to develop 
                       
26 The literature on research joint ventures (RJVs) indeed suggests that asymmetries between 
members of an RJV make the RJV less likely to succeed. See, for instance, RÖLLER et al. 
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mobile payment solutions. If they develop mobile payment services, MNOs 
would be new entrants in the payment industry. In contrast, banks are 
incumbents in the payment market, and therefore could view mobile 
payments as an improvement over other payment solutions that they 
commercialize (like payment cards). Therefore, banks could face a 
"replacement effect" for the development of mobile payments. Hence, their 
incentives to develop mobile payments might be lower than the incentives of 
MNOs, except that they could have high preemption incentives to protect 
their market share from an entry threat. 
   Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze mobile payments as an innovation in developed 
countries. Our main contribution is to define five cooperation models for the 
development of mobile payment solutions: the light model, the bank-centric 
model, the mobile-centric model, the partial-integration model, and the full-
integration model. Though they seem necessary to target the mass market, 
we argue that the partial- and full-integration models are more costly to 
implement, in particular due to the industry cost structure, which involves 
high fixed costs and low marginal costs. On the other hand, the proliferation 
of mobile payment solutions with the light model (or with the bank-centric 
and mobile centric-models) might restrict mobile payments to niche markets.  
The development of a mass market for mobile payments through the 
partial- or full-integration model might require the setting up of joint ventures 
between banks and MNOs. More research is needed to understand the 
players' incentives to cooperate, and the adequate public intervention to 
foster innovation in payment systems. In particular, factors pertinent to 
transitioning from light to integrated models deserve a separate study. Our 
view is that research should focus on determining the appropriate public 
intervention to reach the socially optimal level of innovation in payment 
systems. For instance, should public authorities encourage the building of 
RJVs by exempting some competitors from antitrust laws (e.g., by allowing 
interchange fees for innovative payment solutions)? Or, should mobile 
payment operators comply with the various banking regulations that are 
designed to ensure stability of payment systems? 112     No. 79, 3
rd Q. 2010 
References 
ARANGO, C. & TAYLOR, V. (2008): "Merchants' Costs of Accepting Means of 
Payment: Is Cash the Least Costly?", Bank of Canada Review, Winter 2008-2009. 
BECK, T., DEMIRGUC-KUNT, A. & SOLEDAD MARTINEZ PERIA, M. (2007): 
"Reaching out: access to and use of banking services across countries", Journal of 
Financial Economics 85(1), 234-266. 
BEDRE-DEFOLIE, Ö. & CALVANO, E. (2010): "Pricing Payment Cards", ESMT 
Working Paper No. 10-005.  
BOURREAU, M. & VERDIER, M. (2010): "Cooperation for Innovation in Payment 
Systems: The Case of Mobile Payments", EconomiX Working Paper 2010-5.  
BRYANT, J. (1980): "A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs and Deposit Insurance", 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 4, 335-344. 
CHAKRAVORTI, S. & KOBOR, E. (2005): "Why Invest in Payment Innovations?", 
Journal of Payment Systems Law, Vol. 1(4), 331-353. 
CHAKRAVORTI, S. & LUBASI, V. (2006): "Payment Instrument Choice: The Case of 
Prepaid Cards", Economic Perspectives, Second Quarter. 
CGAP Focus note no. 43 (2008: "Regulating transformational branchless banking: 
mobile phones and other technologies to increase access to finance", January. 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (2008): Vol. 94, "Recent Payment trends in the US". 
FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) (2009): National Survey of Unbanked 
and Underbanked households. 
Financial Services Authority (United Kingdom) (2007): Principles of good regulation. 
FSD Kenya report (2009): What makes a successful mobile money implementation?, 
M-Pesa in Kenya and Tanzania. 
JACOB, K. (2007): "Are mobile payments the smart cards of the aughts?", Chicago 
Fed Letter, July, no. 240. 
LELAND, H.E. & PYLE, D.H. (1977): "Informational Asymmetries, Financial 
Structure, and Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance, Vol. 32 (2). 
MacANDREWS, J. & ROBERDS, W. (1999): "Payment intermediation and the origins 
of banking", Staff Reports 85, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
ONDRUS, J., LYYTINEN, K. & PIGNEUR, Y. (2009): "Why Mobile Payments Fail? 
Towards a Dynamic and Multi-perspective Explanation", Working Paper. 
ROCHET, J.-C. & TIROLE, J.: 
- (2002): "Cooperation Among Competitors: The Economics of Payment Card 
Associations", RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33 (4), 549-570. M. BOURREAU & M. VERDIER  113 
- (2006): "Two-Sided markets: a progress report", RAND Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 37 (2), 103-122. 
RÖLLER, L.-H., SIEBERT, R. & TOMBAK M.M. (2007): "Why Firms Form (or do not 
Form) RJVs", The Economic Journal, Vol. 117(522), 1122-1144. 
VAN HOVE, L. (2004): Electronic Purses in Euroland: Why Do Penetration and 
Usage Rates Differ?, SUERF Studies no. 2004 (4). 
VERDIER, M. (2006): "Retail Payment Systems: What do we learn from Two-sided 
Markets?", COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, no. 61, 37-51. 
WARIS, F.S., MUBARIK, F.M. & PAU, L.-F. (2006): Mobile Payments in the 
Netherlands: Adoption Bottlenecks and Opportunities, or… Throw Out Your Wallets, 
ERIS Report N° ERS-2006-012-LIS. 
WEYL, G. (2010): "A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms", forthcoming in the 
American Economic Review, 100(4). 
World Bank Research Report (2008): Finance for all? Policies and Pitfalls in 
expanding access. 
World Bank (2009):  Migration and Development brief 11, November 3
rd 2009. 
 
 